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When a defendant fails to object to an issue at sentencing, he may 
lose the right to make that challenge again later—but only if the court 
determines that he acted intentionally.1 If a defendant disagrees with 
his lawyer’s decision not to object, should the lawyer’s failure to 
object constitute an intentional choice by the defendant?2 Principles of 
waiver should be construed in favor of the defendant and the court has 
the discretion to infer a defendant’s intent based on the record.3 If 
there are ambiguities in the record, the court should resolve them in 
the light most favorable to the defendant, particularly when issues of 
sentencing are concerned.4 
                                                 
 J.D. candidate, May 2019, Chicago-Kent College of Law, Illinois Institute of 
Technology; B.A., Sociology, Northwestern University, 2010. 
1 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United 
States v. Murry, 395 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
2 See United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 973 (7th Cir. 2018). 
3 United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
4 United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 1002 (7th Cir. 2010) (citing United 
States v. Richardson, 238 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
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Wayne Scott was on conditional release after serving a term of 
imprisonment for fraud, under 18 U.S.C. § 1341.5 Scott violated the 
conditions of his release, and on January 17, 2017, the district court 
held a revocation hearing to address his latest violation – opening a 
new line of credit without consulting his probation officer.6 After the 
court determined that Scott did violate the terms of his release, the 
government recommended five months in custody and an additional 
thirty-six months of supervised release based on a sentencing 
recommendation prepared for a previous probation violation.7 The 
court declined to place Scott into custody because of his compliance 
with his restitution payments.8 Defense counsel stated, “we have no 
objection to extending the period of mandatory supervised release.”9 
The court then advised Scott to follow the terms of his conditional 
release to avoid future court involvement and Scott began to speak.10 
Scott stated, “Your Honor, I just want to add for the record,” before his 
defense attorney interrupted, advising Scott to speak with him first.11 
After speaking to Scott, defense counsel advised the judge that Scott 
had nothing to say and the hearing ended.12  
Scott retained new counsel for his next status hearing when the 
court discovered it had to impose a period of custody to extend Scott’s 
supervised release period.13 The new attorney requested a shorter 
period of supervised release but made no mention about the lack of 
sentencing guidelines calculation or the fact that Scott was not 
permitted to allocute at the revocation hearing.14 Scott later filed a 
motion to reconsider challenging the district court’s supervised release 
                                                 




9 Id. at 974. 
10 Id. 
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violation finding, advocating for a shorter sentence of supervised 
release, and stating that he disagreed with his attorney’s decision to not 
object to the sentence of supervised release.15 The district court denied 
the motion and Scott timely appealed.16 The Seventh Circuit affirmed 
the district court’s ruling, finding that Scott waived both his challenge 
to the lack of sentencing guidelines calculation and his right to 
allocution.17  
The first part of this comment will discuss the principle of waiver 
and how its standard differs from that of forfeiture. The second section 
will summarize the Seventh Circuit’s decision in United States v. Scott. 
The third section will analyze the Seventh Circuit’s decision in Scott 
against precedent in the circuit and argue that the case should have 
been remanded to the district court for a new calculation under the 




When a defendant intentionally and voluntarily gives up a claim 
to a known right, it constitutes a waiver of that right, precludes 
appellate review, and extinguishes error.18 “Waiver principles should 
be construed liberally in favor of the defendant.”19 When a defendant 
does not make an objection at his sentencing hearing that may 
communicate that he does not wish to argue the sentence imposed.20 
When a defendant decides not to make an argument for tactical 
reasons that constitutes an intentional decision - not mere oversight - 
and he has waived his ability to make that argument later.21 If a 




18 United States v. Haddad, 462 F.3d 783, 793 (7th Cir. 2006) (citing United 
States v. Murry, 395 F.3d 712, 717 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
19 United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001). 
20 United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007) (citing Jaimes-
Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848). 
21 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848. 
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defendant does not make an argument due to oversight or negligence, 
however, that constitutes forfeiture and may be subject to plain error 
review at the appellate level, if the defendant can demonstrate good 
cause.22 “Whether a particular right is waivable; whether the defendant 
must participate personally in the waiver; whether certain procedures 
are required for waiver; and whether the defendant’s choice must be 
particularly informed or voluntary, all depend on the right at stake.”23 
When a legal rule was violated, there has been an error regardless of 
whether the defendant timely objected.24  
The Seventh Circuit found that a defendant waived his rights at 
sentencing when he made arguments against certain findings in his 
presentence report and then stated that he had no further objections.25 
Similarly, when a defense attorney stated he had reviewed the 
presentence report with his client and they had no objections to the 
guidelines calculation, the court of appeals found that the defendant 
knew of his right to object and intentionally decided not to do so.26  
The major difference between waiver and forfeiture is that 
forfeiture does not extinguish error on appeal and instead permits 
review for plain error.27 However, the line between waiver and 
forfeiture is not always clear, and courts sometimes find it difficult to 
distinguish the two.28 Waiver is an intentional decision to not assert a 
right while forfeiture is an accidental or negligent “failure to make the 
timely assertion of a right.”29 To determine whether a right was waived 
or forfeited, the court must examine the defendant’s mental state at the 
                                                 
22 United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007). 
23 United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 733 (1993) (citing 2 W. LAFAVE & J. 
ISRAEL, 3 CRIM. PROC. § 11.6 (4th ed.1984); George E. Dix, Waiver in Criminal 
Procedure: A Brief for More Careful Analysis, 55 TEX. L. REV. 193 (1977)). 
24 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733-34. 
25 Brodie, 507 F.3d at 531. 
26 United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 2000). 
27 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing Olano, 507 
U.S. at 731). 
28 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 541 
(7th Cir. 2009)). 
29 Olano, 507 U.S. at 733. 
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time he could have made the objection.30 When deciding whether a 
right was waived, the court analyzes each omission to determine 
whether it was a strategic decision to not object.31 It is the 
government’s burden to show a strategic justification for a defendant’s 
failure to object to prove waiver.32 Generally, when a defendant does 
not object to an issue at his sentencing hearing, the court finds that the 
defendant waived the issue; however, there is no rigid “rule that every 
objection not raised at a sentencing hearing is waived.”33 To determine 
a defendant’s intent in not arguing a point, the court makes inferences 
from the record as a whole and considers the particular 
circumstances.34 “[A]n argument should be deemed forfeited rather 
than waived if finding waiver from an ambiguous record would 
compel the conclusion that counsel necessarily would have been 
deficient to advise the defendant not to object.”35 The Seventh Circuit 
found that the failure to object by defendant and his counsel at 
sentencing was merely forfeiture and not waiver when the defendant 
had made an objection to the restitution calculation prior to 
sentencing, even though both the defendant and his counsel stated at 
sentencing that they had no objections.36  
When a court finds that a defendant forfeited a right, then the 
“remarkably demanding” plain error tests applies.37 A defendant bears 
the burden to show: “(1) an error or defect that (2) is clear or obvious 
                                                 
30 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing United States v. Anderson, 604 F.3d 997, 
1001 (7th Cir. 2010)). 
31 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing Anderson, 604 F.3d at 1002). 
32 Anderson, 604 F.3d at 1001-02. 
33 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (quoting United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 
845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005).  
34 Butler, 777 F.3d at 387 (citing United States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 
(7th Cir. 2009)). 
35 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Richardson, 238 
F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
36 United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008). 
37 Butler, 777 F.3d at 388 (citing Anderson, 604 F.3d at 1002). 
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and (3) affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”38 If a defendant 
meets this burden, the court has the discretion to correct the error – it 
is not required to do so.39 The court may correct the error when it 
“seriously affect[s] the fairness, integrity or public reputation of 
judicial proceedings.”40 The standard of plain error review “is 
permissive, not mandatory.”41 The Supreme Court has determined it 
should be exercised “in those circumstances in which a miscarriage of 
justice would otherwise result.”42 While “miscarriage of justice” 
applies to cases where the defendant is actually innocent, the doctrine 
is generally applied more broadly.43 
Judges are required to calculate the guidelines range before 
sentencing a defendant to a term of supervised release.44 While judges 
are not required to sentence a defendant to a term within the range, the 
federal code requires them to consider the enumerated subsections in 
section 3553(a) when deciding the length of a sentence of 
imprisonment and conditions of supervised release.45 The record must 
indicate that the district court actually considered the guidelines 
range.46 Failure to do so constitutes reversible error.47  
When a defendant argued that his criminal history score was 
improperly calculated and the calculation he advocated for led to a 
sentencing guidelines range that overlapped with the range calculated 
                                                 
38 Butler, 777 F.3d at 388 (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 
(1993)). 
39 Id. 
40 United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008) (quoting United 
States v. Kibler, 279 F.3d 511, 514 (7th Cir. 2002)). 
41 Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. 
42 United States v. Young, 470 U.S. 1, 15 (1985) (quoting United States v. 
Frady, 456 U.S. 152, 163 (1982)). 
43 Olano, 507 U.S. at 735. 
44 United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1181 (7th Cir. 2015). 
45 United States v. Griffin, 806 F.3d 890, 892 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United 
States v. Thompson, 777 F.3d 368, 373 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing 18 U.S.C. §§ 3553(c), 
3583(c))). 
46 United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601, 610 (7th Cir. 2017). 
47 Downs, 784 F.3d at 1181. 
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by the district court, the Seventh Circuit found that was insufficient to 
constitute plain error because the defendant failed to show a 
substantial right was affected.48 However, when the district court 
failed to calculate the appropriate sentencing guidelines range before 
imposing a period of supervised release, the Seventh Circuit found that 
was not a harmless error because judges are required to consider the 
guidelines range before imposing any sentence – even though they are 
not required to actually impose a sentence within that resulting 
range.49  
 
UNITED STATES V. SCOTT 
 
Wayne Scott was on conditional release after completing a prison 
term for defrauding investors and potential investors.50 As part of his 
supervised release, Scott was not permitted to open new lines of credit 
without the approval of his probation officer.51 The government filed a 
motion alleging that Scott violated that provision of his release on 
January 17, 2017 and on July 6, 2017, the district court held a 
revocation hearing.52 The district court determined that Scott violated 
the terms of his release and, based off of a report created for a 
previous violation, the government recommended five months in 
custody and an additional thirty-six months of supervised release.53 
Because Scott had been complying with his restitution payments, the 
court denied imposing a period of custody.54 The government renewed 
its request for an extended period of supervised release, and defense 
counsel advised that he had no objection.55 The court imposed the 
thirty-six months of supervised release and then addressed Scott to 
                                                 
48 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 389 (7th Cir. 2015). 
49 Downs, 784 F.3d at 1181. 





55 Id. at 974. 
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remind him to continue making restitution payments to avoid future 
court appearances.56 Scott began to address the court, saying, “Your 
Honor, I just want to add for the record,” before his defense attorney 
interrupted, saying “No, you’re going to talk to me first.”57 After 
speaking to Scott, defense counsel stated, “Pardon me, Judge. Thank 
you for the opportunity to talk. I don’t believe he has anything else he 
wants to tell the Court,” and the hearing ended.58  
Scott was represented by a different attorney at his next status 
hearing when the court determined that the extension of Scott’s 
supervised release required a period of custody.59 The court ordered a 
one day sentence with time considered served followed by the thirty-
six months of supervised release and then asked whether there was any 
objection.60 Scott’s new counsel stated he was, “not looking to reopen 
Mr. Scott’s sentencing hearing,” but advocated for a shorter period of 
supervised release.61 Counsel did not argue that the sentencing 
guidelines calculation was not performed or that Scott had no 
opportunity to allocute62 at the revocation hearing.63  
After the status hearing, Scott filed a motion to reconsider, on the 
grounds that: he did not agree with his attorney’s decision to not object 
to the additional time of supervised release, no sentencing guidelines 
calculation was performed at the hearing, the penalties were not 
explained to him, and he was not permitted to present mitigating 
                                                 
56 Id. 
57 Id. 




62 Allocution is a defendant’s opportunity to address the court at sentencing. 
The three major theories in support of allocution posit that it allows the defendant 
the opportunity to accept responsibility for his actions, mitigate his sentence, and 
humanize himself to the court. Mark W. Bennett and Ira P. Robbins, Last Words: A 
Survey and Analysis of Federal Judges’ Views of Allocution in Sentencing, 65 ALA. 
L. REV. 735, 739 (2013) (citing Kimberly A. Thomas, Beyond Mitigation: Towards 
a Theory of Allocution, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 2641, 2655-67 (2007)). 
63 Scott, 900 F.3d at 974. 
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factors at the hearing.64 The district court denied Scott’s motion and he 
filed a timely appeal.65  
The Seventh Circuit found that Scott waived his right to challenge 
both the thirty-six months of supervised release imposed and that the 
district court did not allow him to allocute.66 The court noted that 
revocation hearings do not provide the same constitutional rights to a 
defendant that a sentencing hearing does.67 However, the dissent 
addresses this somewhat cryptic statement by pointing out that in a 
revocation hearing, the district court is still required to consider the 
appropriate sentencing guidelines range by at least referencing a report 
prepared by the probation office advising what the guidelines range 
is.68 The court then cited to the fact that Scott’s counsel had no 
objection to the additional thirty-six months of supervised release and 
that while Scott began to speak to the judge, after conferring with his 
counsel, his attorney advised the court Scott had nothing to say.69 The 
majority opined that it did not want to interfere with the attorney-client 
relationship.70  
However, the dissent characterized the revocation hearing and the 
interaction between Scott and his attorney differently.71 Chief Judge 
Wood noted first that the district court did not properly calculate a 
guidelines sentence and instead relied on a report prepared for Scott’s 
previous probation violation.72 Then, Scott’s counsel spoke for him, 
stating that they did not have any objection to the imposition of an 
additional thirty-six months of supervised release.73 Next, defense 
counsel interrupted Scott when he attempted to assert his right to 




67 Id. (citing United States v. Lee, 795 F.3d 682, 685 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
68 Scott, 900 F.3d at 979 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
69 Scott, 900 F.3d at 974. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 975 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
72 Id. at 976 (Wood, J., dissenting).  
73 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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allocute.74 Finally, defense counsel spoke for Scott, advising the court 
that Scott had nothing to say.75 Scott retained a new lawyer and 
attempted to address the lack of sentencing guidelines calculation and 
allocution, but the district court ruled that it was too late.76 The dissent 
performed a thorough analysis of the record, and went line-by- line to 
determine what occurred at the sentencing hearing between the 
government, the court, and the defense.77 The dissent noted that 
Scott’s attorney agreed to extend the period of mandatory supervised 
release before the government or court made a recommendation of 
how many months to extend the supervised release.78 “The 
government recommended a 36-month term only after Scott’s counsel 
had agreed to some extension.”79 The dissent then summarized the end 
of the hearing as follows: Scott attempted to address to court, he was 
interrupted by his attorney, then conferred with his attorney, Scott’s 
attorney then addressed the court to advise the judge that Scott had 
nothing further to say, and the judge did not confirm with Scott instead 
just said, “All right. That’s fine.”80 The dissent concluded, based on its 
reading of the record, that Scott did not waive his arguments regarding 
his right to a sentencing guidelines calculation and allocution and 
would have remanded to the district court for a new revocation hearing 
where the district court would actually calculate the sentencing 
guidelines for Scott’s violation.81 
 
                                                 
74 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
75 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
76 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
77 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
78 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
79 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
80 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
81 Id. (Wood, J., dissenting). 
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Neither Scott nor his counsel objected at his revocation hearing to 
the imposition of thirty-six months of supervised release.82 A failure to 
object may communicate his intention to relinquish an argument, but it 
does not automatically constitute a waiver.83 The court should also 
consider whether there was a strategic reason to not object to a 
provision at sentencing and whether it was deficient for defense 
counsel to not object.84 The Scott majority did not consider whether 
there was any strategic reason to not object to the period of supervised 
release suggested by the government.85 Scott retained a new attorney 
after his revocation hearing, and while it is not in the record, the court 
could have inferred it was because Scott was unhappy with his 
previous counsel’s performance at sentencing.86 As the record stands, 
it is at the very least ambiguous as to whether Scott’s previous counsel 
was acting strategically or negligently.87 Principles of waiver are 
meant to be construed in the defendant’s favor.88 When a court 
determines whether a defendant intentionally made the choice to not 
object, it relies on inferences from the record and the circumstances 
particular to the defendant.89 
The facts in Scott are similar to those in United States v. Jaimes-
Jaimes, where the Seventh Circuit found that counsel’s failure to 
object to a sentence enhancement constituted forfeiture – not waiver.90 
                                                 
82 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2018). 
83 United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008) (citing United 
States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005)). 
84 Allen, 529 F.3d at 395 (citing United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531-32 
(7th Cir. 2007); Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848).  
85 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974. 
86 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974. 
87 See id. 
88 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 
532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
89 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015) (citing United 
States v. Garcia, 580 F.3d 528, 542 (7th Cir. 2009)). 
90 See Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848. 
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Scott’s counsel did not allow him to address the court and Scott later 
stated that he disagreed with his lawyer’s decision to not challenge the 
sentencing guidelines calculation.91 In Jaimes-Jaimes, the Seventh 
Circuit found that while the statement from defense counsel that his 
client did not have an objection to the content of the presentence report 
was significant, it did not automatically constitute a waiver of the right 
of the defendant to later appeal any guidelines calculation in the 
report.92 Despite the court ruling under similar circumstances that a 
defendant had waived his right to appeal the guidelines sentence in his 
presentence report, the court ruled that it was not “an inflexible rule 
that every objection not raised at a sentencing hearing is waived.”93 
When the Seventh Circuit could not think of any strategic reason for a 
defendant to choose not to object to multiple level increases in his 
offense level and the government also offered no reasonable 
justification, the court of appeals found that the most probable 
explanation was that the defendant’s counsel made an oversight in not 
challenging the increase.94 That oversight by defense counsel was 
accidental and not an intentional choice made by defendant and 
therefore constituted forfeiture and was subject to plain error review.95  
The Seventh Circuit in Scott was aware of its decision in Jaimes-
Jaimes, the majority opinion even cites the case while discussing the 
concept of waiver.96 However, the Seventh Circuit did not discuss the 
facts of Jaimes-Jaimes or distinguish it from Scott.97 Rene Jaimes-
Jaimes (“Jaimes”) pleaded guilty to unlawfully remaining in the 
United States after being deported.98 The presentence report prepared 
by probation and the written plea agreement prepared by the parties 
                                                 
91 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974. 
92 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848. 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Id. at 849. 
96 Scott, 900 F.3d at 973 (quoting Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (“The 
touchstone of waiver is a knowing and intentional decision.”)). 
97 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 973. 
98 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 846. 
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both calculated that Jaimes’ offense level should be increased by 
sixteen points.99 The district court accepted the calculation and 
sentenced Jaimes to seventy-eight months of imprisonment, which was 
within the calculated guidelines range of seventy to seventy-eight 
months.100 On appeal, Jaimes argued that his offense level was 
improperly increased by sixteen and should have only been increased 
by eight, and that miscalculation constituted plain error.101 The 
Seventh Circuit agreed, vacated, and remanded for resentencing.102 
The government argued that when defense counsel advised the court 
that he had no objection to the guidelines calculation Jaimes waived 
his right to challenge the calculation on appeal.103 The court agreed 
that in previous rulings it had found that defendants waived their right 
to a sentencing guidelines argument under similar circumstances; 
however, in those previous cases the court found the defendant was 
acting strategically.104 In Jaimes-Jaimes, the court found that the only 
plausible explanation for defendant’s failure to object to the sentence 
enhancement was oversight by his attorney.105 Similarly, in Scott, no 
strategic explanation is provided to explain why Scott’s counsel did 
not object to the period of supervised release offered by the 
government at sentencing.106 The court had already advised the parties 
that it would not impose a period of custody based on Scott’s 
compliance with restitution payments.107 The dissent in Scott pointed 





103 Id. at 847-48 (citing United States v. Staples, 202 F.3d 992, 995 (7th Cir. 
2000) (finding that defendant had waived right to challenge guidelines calculation 
when his attorney advised the court that he had reviewed the presentence report with 
his client and they had no objection)).  
104 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848 (citing United States v. Martinez-Jimenez, 
294 F.3d 921, 923 (7th Cir. 2002); United States v. Cooper, 243 F.3d 411, 416 (7th 
Cir. 2001)).   
105 Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d at 848. 
106 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 973. 
107 Id.  
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out that the record showed that Scott’s attorney stated he had no 
objection to a period of supervised release before the court even 
advised how long that period might be.108 If counsel did not even 
know what sentence the court was going to impose, how could his 
decision to not object to it reflect an intentional, strategic decision? 
The “touchstone of waiver” is when a defendant makes objections 
to certain conditions of supervised release and then intentionally 
decides to not make objections to others.109 By purposefully choosing 
to not object, the defendant has waived any challenges he may have 
had to the provision.110 Scott’s counsel did not make any objection to 
either the failure of the court to perform a sentencing calculation or the 
imposition of thirty-six months of supervised release.111 As remarked 
above, Scott’s counsel blindly asserted there was no objection to a 
period of supervised release before even learning what period of time 
the court would impose.112  
When an attorney argued for a shorter sentence for his client 
instead of making a direct challenge to the sentencing guidelines 
calculation, the court found forfeiture of a right instead of waiver.113 In 
United States v. Butler, the defendant did not challenge the calculation 
of his sentencing guidelines and the Seventh Circuit found that it was 
due to oversight by defendant’s counsel rather than an intentional 
decision and therefore constitute forfeiture and not waiver.114 Upon 
examining the record, the circuit court concluded that counsel objected 
to the inclusion of a state forgery offense that increased the 
defendant’s guidelines calculation by two points, but did not make the 
                                                 
108 Id. at 977 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
109 United States v. Raney, 842 F.3d 1041, 1044 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting 
United States v. Armour, 804 F.3d 859, 865 (7th Cir. 2015)). 
110 Raney, 842 F.3d 1044 (citing United States v. Gabriel, 831 F.3d 811, 814 
(7th Cir. 2016)). 
111 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 973. 
112 See id. at 977 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
113 See United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 387 (7th Cir. 2015). 
114 Id. 
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challenge to the guidelines calculation directly.115 The government 
could not articulate a strategic reason for defense counsel to not make 
the challenge and therefore the Seventh Circuit found that the 
defendant forfeited his right to challenge the guidelines calculation.116 
Similarly, Scott retained new counsel for his first status hearing after 
sentencing who argued for a shorter period of supervised release 
instead of making an outright challenge to the lack of sentencing 
guidelines calculation.117 The court in Scott did not consider whether 
there was a strategic reason for Scott’s counsel to not make that 
challenge. The court could have made an inference that the failure to 
challenge the sentencing guidelines calculation was an oversight based 
on the fact that Scott filed a motion to reconsider after that hearing 
where he argued that he disagreed with his previous counsel’s decision 
to not object and reasserted his new counsel’s arguments for a shorter 
period of supervised release.118 Instead, the  court concluded that if 
Scott wanted to challenge the lack of sentencing guidelines 
calculation, the time to do so was at his first hearing after 
sentencing.119  
The court’s analysis in Butler did not stop at the conclusion of 
forfeiture.120 The defendant still had to show the following under the 
plain error test: “(1) an error or defect that (2) is clear or obvious and 
(3) affects the defendant’s substantial rights.”121 The court found that 
Butler did not meet the plain error standard when he argued that the 
state forgery conviction should have been considered relevant conduct 
under the sentencing guidelines.122 Butler argued that the actions 
underlying the state forgery conviction were part of the same course of 
conduct that he was being sentenced for and, therefore, should not 
                                                 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 388. 
117 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 974 (7th Cir. 2018). 
118 See id. 
119 Id. 
120 United States v. Butler, 777 F.3d 382, 388 (7th Cir. 2015). 
121 Id. (citing United States v. Olano, 507 U.S. 725, 736 (1993)). 
122 Butler, 777 F.3d at 388. 
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have increased his criminal history score by two points.123 However, 
the court found that the conduct was not related to the specific course 
of conduct, and even if the two points had not been added to Butler’s 
criminal history score, the corresponding guidelines range would have 
been eighteen to twenty-four months.124 Because Butler was sentenced 
to twenty-four months with the two point increase to his criminal 
history score, he could not show that the district court would have 
imposed a lower sentence and therefore Butler did not show that the 
error affected his substantial rights.125 In Scott, no sentencing 
guidelines calculation was ever done for this particular supervised 
release.126 For that reason, when considering whether the lack of 
sentencing guidelines calculation constituted plain error, the facts in 
Scott more closely resemble those in United States v. Allen, where the 
district court failed to make a proper calculation of restitution owed.127  
When a defendant and his defense counsel independently told the 
court they had no objections at sentencing, the Seventh Circuit still 
found evidence in the record that indicated the defendant merely 
forfeited his right to challenge the district court’s restitution 
calculation.128 The court of appeals found that the defendant had 
objected to the calculation before the sentencing and then determined 
there was no strategic reason to forego that challenge at the hearing.129 
Therefore, the failure of defense counsel to object constituted 
forfeiture and the defendant was entitled to plain error review.130 The 
circuit court vacated the restitution and remanded the case to the 
district court for a new calculation, finding that it was plain error when 
the district court did not calculate the actual loss suffered by the 




126 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 980 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, J., 
dissenting). 
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defendant’s victim.131 The Scott dissent notes that when revoking a 
defendant’s supervised release, the district court must calculate and 
consider the recommended guidelines range.132 The government relied 
on a 2015 report created by the probation office regarding an unrelated 
violation of Scott’s supervised release when it suggested a period of 
thirty-six months of supervised release for the 2017 violation.133 The 
Probation Office never prepared a report for the violation that was the 
subject of the hearing in 2017; there was no sentencing guidelines 
calculation done by the probation office or the district court for that 
particular violation of supervised release.134 “Judges are required to 
calculate the applicable guidelines range before imposing sentence, 
though not bound to sentence within that range.”135 The district court 
is the one responsible for calculating the guidelines sentence and the 
Supreme Court has noted that a miscalculation of the guidelines leads 
to a “risk of unnecessary deprivation of liberty [that] particularly 
undermines the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial 
proceedings.”136 Before a judge can decide the length of a defendant’s 
term of supervised release, he must calculate the guidelines range 
according to the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), and use the resulting 
range as an anchor in determining an appropriate sentence.137 Because 
the guidelines are so essential to sentencing, there is a presumption 
that failing to even calculate the guidelines sentence would affect a 
defendant’s sentence and therefore would constitute plain error by the 
district court.138  
                                                 
131 Id. 
132 United States v. Scott, 900 F.3d 972, 979 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, J., 
dissenting) (citing United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1181 (7th Cir. 2015); 
United States v. Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 959 (7th Cir. 2011)). 
133 Scott, 900 F.3d at 980 (7th Cir. 2018) (Wood, J., dissenting). 
134 Id. 
135 United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015). 
136 Scott, 900 F.3d at 980 (Wood, J., dissenting) (quoting Rosales-Mireles v. 
United States, 138 S. Ct. 1897, 1908 (2018)). 
137 Downs, 784 F.3d at 1182. 
138 Scott, 900 F.3d at 980 (Wood, J., dissenting) (citing Downs, 784 F.3d at 
1182). 
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The Seventh Circuit’s precedent concerning principles of waiver 
and forfeiture demonstrate that there is a presumption that a 
defendant’s failure to object was not a waiver absent express, strategic 
intent by the defendant and his defense counsel to do so.139 Even in 
circumstances where a defendant appears to have intentionally waived 
a right, the court retains discretion to examine the record for evidence 
that failure to object at sentencing was an oversight.140 This follows 
the Seventh Circuit’s declaration that “[w]aiver principles should be 
construed liberally in favor of the defendant.”141 In light of its 
precedent, the court in Scott should have inferred from the record that 
Scott’s former counsel did not strategically and intentionally decide 
not to object to the imposition of thirty-six months of supervised 
release. When Scott retained new counsel, his attorney advocated for a 
shorter sentence at the first status hearing after sentencing; Scott filed 
a motion to reconsider shortly after that hearing arguing that he did not 
agree with his previous counsel’s decision to not object; and in that 
same motion Scott addressed the issue that no sentencing guidelines 
calculation was completed.142 At one point, the dissent characterized 
this case, after considering the record, as “not a good candidate for a 
finding of forfeiture, much less waiver.”143 
The majority in Scott argued that if Scott wished to challenge the 
lack of sentencing guidelines calculation and his inability to allocute, 
he should have done so when he retained new counsel at the status 
hearing.144 But, as the dissent points out, that is the language of 
                                                 
139 See United States v. Allen, 529 F.3d 390, 395 (7th Cir. 2008). 
140 Id. 
141 United States v. Jaimes-Jaimes, 406 F.3d 845, 848 (7th Cir. 2005) (citing 
United States v. Sumner, 265 F.3d 532, 539 (7th Cir. 2001)). 
142 See Scott, 900 F.3d at 974. 
143 Id. at 979 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
144 Id. at 973. 
18
Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 14, Iss. 1 [2018], Art. 7
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol14/iss1/7




forfeiture.145 Clearly, the majority did not perceive any strategic 
advantage by Scott’s lawyer to not objecting at that time; therefore, to 
not do so was an oversight and would entitle Scott to plain error 
review.146 While district court judges are no longer required to 
sentence within the guidelines,147 they are required to calculate the 
appropriate guidelines range and consider it when imposing a 
sentence.148 To not even calculate a guidelines sentence before 
imposing a period of supervised release was plain error that clearly 
had a substantial effect on Scott’s rights. The Seventh Circuit should 
have remanded to the district court to hold a new sentencing hearing, 
calculate the guidelines range for the violation at issue, consider that 
range prior to sentencing Scott, and then allow Scott the opportunity to 
allocute.  
                                                 
145 Id. at 980 (Wood, J., dissenting). 
146 See United States v. Brodie, 507 F.3d 527, 531 (7th Cir. 2007). 
147 United States v. Booker, 543 U.S. 220 (2005). 
148 United States v. Downs, 784 F.3d 1180, 1182 (7th Cir. 2015). 
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